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THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT: A WELCOME
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITY AMONG
STATE LAWS
I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines has
created a wide disparity in the levels of protection afforded to employees
across the United States.I These doctrines have significantly eroded the
common-law Employment-at-Will Rule, which presumes that an em-
ployee is terminable at the will of the employer.2 The Employment-at-
Will Rule permits an employer to "dismiss an at-will employee for a
good reason, a bad reason, or for no reason at all. ' 3 States have recog-
1. See Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to
Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1816 (1980) ("Employees in
the United States enjoy dramatically disparate levels of protection against the
risk of wrongful discharge by employers."). For a discussion of the impact of the
lack of uniformity among state termination laws, see infra notes 7-8 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines,
see infra notes 42-125 and accompanying text.
2. See Note, supra note 1, at 1816 (common-law rule presumes terminable at
will employment); see also HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND
PRACTICE (1987). The erosion of the Employment-at-Will Rule began in the
early 1970s. Id. at 2. Prior to this period, an employee who was terminated for
no reason had no remedy unless the employer had violated a statute prohibiting
discrimination. Id.
3. PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 1 n. 1. The Employment-at-Will Rule has been
similarly defined by a number of commentators. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment-At- Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer
Power, 67 COLO. L. REV. 1404, 1416 (1967) ("[I]n the absence of a statute or
agreement specifically limiting the right of discharge, the employer may dis-
charge his employee at any time for any reason."); Donald H.J. Hermann &
Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights In One'sJob: The Case for Limiting Employment-At- Will,
24 ARIZ. L. REV. 763, 763 (1982) ("[A]bsent either a contractual or statutory
provision, any employment relationship is one at will which is terminable by
either party, employer or employee, for cause or no cause."); Theodore J. St.
Antoine, The Revision of Employment-at-Will Enters a New Phase, 36 LAB. L.J. 563,
563 (1985) ("[A]n employment contract of indefinite duration can be terminated
by either party at any time for any reason."); Comment, Employment-at-Will-Em-
ployers May Not Discharge At-will Employees for Reasons that Violate Public Policy-
Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161, 161
("[E]mployers may discharge an at-will employee 'for good cause, for no cause,
or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of a legal
wrong.'" (quoting Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025
(Ariz. 1985))). A Tennessee Supreme Court case is often cited in support of the
Employment-at-Will Rule. Gary E. Murg & Clifford Scharman, Employment At
Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 329, 329 n.1 (1982)
(citing Payne v. Western & Atd. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)). The Tennessee
Supreme Court stated:
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they
(1527)
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nized three common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines as exceptions to
the Employment-at-Will Rule.4 Depending on the state, an employee
who has been terminated at the will of an employer may recover dam-
ages resulting from termination based on theories of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, implied contract or public policy.5
Although these doctrines have progressively eroded the Employment-
at-Will Rule, a presumption of legal dismissal remains and is rebuttable
only upon a showing of a violation of one of these doctrines. 6
The emergence of these common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines
and the resulting lack of uniformity among the states have created much
confusion for both employees and employers. 7 The employment rela-
please, and to discharge or retain [employees] at will for good cause or
for no cause, or even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an
unlawful act per se. It is a right which an [employee] may exercise in
the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause
as the employer.
Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884), overruled on other
grounds by Hutton v. Waters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)).
4. See PERRITr, supra note 2, at 2. Employees may obtain legal redress
under one of the three doctrines if they can show that the factual circumstances
of their dismissals fit within the scope of a given doctrine. Id. The theories of
recovery under these doctrines rest in tort or in contract. See ANDREW D. HILL,
"WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE 11 (1987) ("Judicial erosion of the common law employment-at-will
rule ... rests primarily on application of either 'contract' or 'tort' theories to
circumvent application of the at-will rule.").
5. See PERRITr, supra note 2, at 2-3; see also Fred Strasser, Employment-At-Will:
The Death of a Doctrine?, NAT'L L.J.,Jan. 20, 1986, at 6. For a discussion of each of
these doctrines, see infra notes 42-125 and accompanying text.
The existence of the doctrines has caused the business community to take
measures to protect itself against wrongful discharge damage suits:
Many corporations ... now require new employees to sign a dis-
claimer stating they understand they've been hired on an at-will basis
with no claims on job security. And after an employee joins the com-
pany, his personnel file will receive far more attention than in the past,
with an eye toward how a jury might see it in the future.
• .."Employers are less quick on the trigger in making decisions
today. Rather than pre-emptorily firing someone, many clients now
have a human resources manager review the case to determine if there
are really sound reasons. There is a greater element of fairness to the
relationship."
Strasser, supra, at 6-7 (quoting Joseph W. Ambash, management lawyer with Fo-
ley, Hoag & Eliot in Boston and executive editor of Employment-at-ltill Reporter).
6. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 2. ("The law in no American jurisdiction re-
quires private employers to demonstrate just cause for terminating an
employee.").
7. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT 1 (1991) [hereinafter MODEL
ACT] (prefatory note). One legal scholar has noted that the modifications to the
Employment-at-Will Rule have produced a "flood of wrongful dismissal litiga-
tion." PERRITr, supra note 2, at 37 (citing Cox v. Resilient Flooring Div., 638 F.
Supp. 726 (C.D. Cal. 1986)). In Cox v. Resilient Flooring Division, a district court
noted the large volume of wrongful termination cases and suggested that the
solution must come from the legislature, not the judiciary. Cox v. Resilient
Flooring Div., 638 F. Supp. 726, 736 (C.D. Cal. 1986). The court stated: "Rules
1528 [Vol. 37: p. 1527
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tion is intertwined with commerce, which is inevitably interstate com-
merce in today's economy. Moreover, people in the work force
commonly travel across state lines to reach their place of employment.
For example, the Philadelphia work force draws residents from Dela-
ware and New Jersey as well as Pennsylvania. Therefore, because an
employee may be hired in one state, work in another, and be fired in a
third, both employers and employees are uncertain as to their substan-
tive rights and obligations. 8
In response to the growing disparity among the states' wrongful
dismissal laws, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws met in August 1991 and approved the Model Employment
Termination Act (Model Act). 9 The primary purpose of the Model Act
is to provide uniformity in employment termination law among the
states that adopt it.' 0 The Model Act is also intended to remedy the
inadequate protection of employee rights under existing wrongful dis-
missal doctrines. I I
The Model Act most likely will be strongly supported by the states
for two reasons. First, the general topic of employment relations affects
nearly everyone in the country because most people are either employ-
ees or employers. 12 More significantly, the success of other acts
promulgated by the Uniform Law Commissioners, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code13 and the Uniform Partnership Act, 14 suggests that
the Model Act will be adopted by a great number of states.
This Comment will begin by examining the historical framework of
the Employment-at-Will Rule. After addressing the historical develop-
ment, the discussion will concentrate on the development of the excep-
tions to the Employment-at-Will Rule. Next, the Comment will focus on
designed for general application in this regard must come from the legislature
so that everyone simultaneously is made aware of and becomes subject to the
same requirements." Id. For a further discussion of the need for legislation in
the area of wrongful dismissal, see PERRiTr, supra note 2, at 493-95.
8. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 1, 7 (prefatory note) (discussing desira-
bility of uniformity regarding employees' substantive rights).
9. Id. §§ 1-14 app.
10. Id. at 7 (prefatory note).
11. Id. at 4 (prefatory note).
12. Id. A recent survey conducted by Professor Stuart Henry of Eastern
Michigan University demonstrated that "40 out of 45 responding states and ter-
ritories have had bills introduced in their legislatures in the past decade con-
cerning 'employment termination, at-will employment, or a related subject.'
The subject is plainly a matter of intense current interest." Id.
13. UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 1 U.L.A. 1 (1992). The Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) governs commercial transactions, including "sales, commercial
paper, bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk transfers, warehouse
receipts, bills of lading, other documents of title, investment securities, and se-
cured transactions, including certain sales of accounts, chattel paper, and con-
tract rights." 1 U.L.A. at 3. All of the'states have adopted the U.C.C. Id. at 1-2.
14. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1992). All of the states except
Louisiana have adopted the Uniform Partnership Act. 6 U.L.A. at 1-2.
1992] COMMENT 1529
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the current differing approaches to wrongful termination found at the
state level. The Model Act will then be analyzed. Finally, this Comment
will conclude that the Model Act provides a welcome solution to the
disparity among state laws and should therefore be adopted by the
states.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Framework
During the nineteenth century, Anglo-American employment law
was grounded in the theory that the employment relationship was a
master-servant relationship. 15 The relationship was looked upon as a
status relationship in which the master and servant owed reciprocal du-
ties to one another. 16 The master was obligated to provide for the ser-
vant's physical and moral well-being, 17 while the servant was obligated
to work diligently and to obey the master.' 8
These obligations were not defined by any contractual agreement
but instead by public policy and custom.19 In nineteenth-century Eng-
land, the law presumed that a general hiring meant a hiring for one
year.20 If the employment lasted beyond one year, the employment was
15. Hermann & Sor, supra note 3, at 769. The law of master and servant
was firmly established in a society where "subordination to legitimate authority was
thought to be a natural, inevitable, and even welcome accompaniment of moral
grace and practical virtue." PHILIP SELZNICK, LAw, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE 123 (1980). The master-servant relationship was characterized as a "do-
mestic relation," with the household serving as its model. Hermann & Sor, supra
note 3, at 769; see also SELZNICK, supra, at 123 ("The old law of master and ser-
vant looked to the household as a model and saw in its just governance the
foundations of orderly society."). The worker was deemed a member of the
master's household and usually stayed with the same master for life. Id.
16. PERRITr, supra note 3, at 6; accord Ellen R. Peirce et al., Employee Termina-
tion at Will. A Principled Approach, 28 VILL. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1982) (describing
status-based master-servant relationship with reciprocal rights and responsibili-
ties); Claude D. Rohwer, Terminable-At-Will Employment: New Theories forJob Secur-
ity, 15 PAC. L.J. 759, 760-61 (1984) (same); Note, supra note 1, at 1824 (same).
17. SELZNICK, supra note 15, at 128. The master was obligated to provide
the servant with subsistence, adequate lodging and moral guidance. Id. If a ser-
vant was injured on the job, the master also had to provide medical care, and he
"could not discharge a servant for an incurable illness." Id. (quoting RICHARD
B. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA 18 (1946)).
18. PERRiTT, supra note 2, at 6.
19. SELZNICK, supra note 15, at 123; see also PERRITr, supra note 2, at 6 ("The
obligations on both sides were not matters of contract . . . [but rather] were
obligations imposed on each by the common law as a matter of public policy,
and therefore the law gave little emphasis to the subjective intent of the parties
as to what their relationship should be." (footnote omitted)). The terms of em-
ployment were predominantly implied by law; "it was not contemplated that the
parties would design their own relationship." SELZNICK, supra note 15, at 123
(emphasis omitted).
20. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340
1530 [Vol. 37: p. 1527
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terminable only at the end of an additional year. 2 ' While American
courts often applied this one-year-presumption rule in cases involving
domestic or agricultural workers, they departed from it when dealing
with other indefinite hirings.2 2
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution in America, the princi-
ple of freedom of contract became a powerful force that contributed to
the movement of the employment relationship from the "traditional do-
mestic setting into a commercial context." '23 In accordance with the
(1974). In 1771, Blackstone summarized the English rule of a one-year pre-
sumption of employment as follows:
If the hiring be general, without any particular time limited, the law
construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity,
that the servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout
all the revolutions of the respective seasons; as well as when there is
work to be done, as when there is not.
HILL, supra note 4, at 2 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND 425 (Bell ed. 1771)); accord Jay M. Feinman, The Development of
the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-20 (1976) (noting
fairness in Blackstone's rule that employers be required to hire at-will employees
for full year, not just for planting and harvest seasons); Daniel A. Mathews, A
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435,
1439 (1975) (noting that Blackstone's rule recognized obligations placed on
both parties); Peirce et al., supra note 16, at 3-4 (noting effect of feudal attitudes
on at-will employment).
Blackstone's rule was based on equitable principles. Inequity would result
if" 'masters could have the benefit of servants' labor during planting and har-
vest seasons but discharge them to avoid supporting them during the unproduc-
tive winter' . . . [or if] servants who were supported during the unproductive
winter season 'could leave their masters' service when their labor was most
needed.'" HILL, supra note 4, at 2-3 (citing Jay M. Feinman, The Development of
the Employment-At-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976)). Under the
English approach, the presumption of one-year employment was applied to all
classes of workers. Id. at 3.
21. Note, supra note 20, at 340 (citing Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep.
786 (C.P. 1827)).
22. HILL, supra note 4, at 3. The law of employment in America was unset-
tled from the early to mid-nineteenth century on the issue of indefinite hiring, as
shown in treatises and case law during this period. Id. For instance, Connecti-
cut did not recognize Blackstone's rule. Feinman, supra note 20, at 122-23 (cit-
ing TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FEMME, OF PARENT AND CHILD,
GUARDIAN AND WARD, MASTER AND SERVANT, AND OF THE POWERS OF COURTS OF
CHANCERY 347 (1846)). New York, however, did give effect to the one-year pre-
sumption rule. HILL, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255
(1857)). Some commentators have attributed this confusion to the "fact that
master and servant law was traditionally classified as a domestic relation, and as
such was characterized by a personal and familial atmosphere." Id. at 4 (citing
Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge.- The Duty to Terminate
Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1824-25 (1980)); see also SELZNICK,
supra note 15, at 123 (discussing use of domestic household as model for em-
ployment relationships); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment
Contracts in the United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85,
90-91 (1982) (discussing master-servant relationship as basis for early employ-
ment law).
23. HILL, supra note 4, at 4. Freedom of contract provided a method by
5
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spirit of contractual freedom, the customary presumption of one-year
employment was repudiated. In its place, the courts adopted a new rule
which presumed indefinite hirings to be terminable at will. 24 The new
American rule was first articulated by Horace Wood, who proclaimed
that a "general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will." 25
Wood's rule served as the foundation of the Employment-at-Will Doc-
trine from which all subsequent exceptions and modifications were
created.2
6
A period of laissez-faire economic development was prevalent to-
ward the end of the nineteenth century. 2 7 The attendant principles of
freedom of contract and mutuality of obligation instilled legitimacy in
which parties could design their own relationships and have them enforced by
courts of law. Id. Some commentators assert that the principle of freedom of
contract caused the shift in American law away from the one-year rule toward
the Employment-at-Will Rule. Id.
24. Note, supra note 1, at 1825. Most American jurisdictions adopted this
new rule. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 9-10. California went one step further and
codified the rule in its statutory code. HILL, supra note 4, at 7 (citing CAL. LAB.
CODE § 2922 (West 1989)). Some American courts, however, continued to rely
on the customary presumption of a one-year hiring. Note, supra note 1, at 1825
n.51. For an articulation of this rule, see infra note 25 and accompanying text.
25. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 9 (quoting HORACE G. WooD, A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877)). More specifically, the
rule stated the following:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is
primafacie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly
hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so
much a day, week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefi-
nite hiring, and no presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but
only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party may serve.
HILL, supra note 4, at 5 (quoting HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT § 134, at 272-73 (2d ed. 1886)); accord Alfred W. Blum-
rosen, Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 432 (1964) ("The
result of a rigorous application of this rule was that most employment contracts
were held to be 'at will.' "); Feinman, supra note 20, at 126 (finding Wood's rule
inadequate and without legal or policy support); Mathews, supra note 20, at
1439; ("In the absence of a written contract for a specific term, the employment
was at will, and the employer's freedom to discharge was absolute."); Murg &
Scharman, supra note 3, at 334-35 (noting shift of burden of proof under Wood's
rule from employer to employee); Peirce et al., supra note 16, at 5 ("This at will
rule enunciated by Wood conforms to the free market model of maximum free-
dom for individual action."); Note, supra note 20, at 341 (noting lack of support
cited by Wood for his rule).
26. HILL, supra note 4, at 5.
27. Hermann & Sor, supra note 3, at 770 n.42. The term "laissez-faire,"
which originated in France, means "let things proceed without interference."
Id. at 770 n.42 (quoting HARRY S. SLOAN, DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 191
(1961)). The principle of laissez-faire was based on the notion that the individ-
ual is most productive when permitted to pursue his own self-interest freely. Id.
Adam Smith adopted the term "laissez-faire" during the first half of the eight-
eenth century to describe the strength of the individual:
The natural effort of every individual to better his own condition, when
suffered to exert itself with freedom and security, is so powerful a prin-
ciple, that it is alone, and without any assistance, not only capable of
1532
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the new Employment-at-Will Rule.28 During the early twentieth cen-
tury, the United States Supreme Court utilized this laissez-faire ap-
proach to conclude that governmental regulation of the employment
relationship infringed upon the freedom of contract. 29 In Adair v. United
States,30 the Court articulated the following rule: "[T]he right of the
[employee] to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is
the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense
with the services of such [employee]." 3' The Court held that an em-
ployer is not under a legal obligation to retain an employee in the ab-
sence of a contract fixing a length of service and controlling the parties'
conduct.3 2
carrying on the society to wealth and prosperity, but of surmounting a
hundred impertinent obstructions ....
Id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book IV, at 508 (E. Cannan ed., 1937)). The doctrine of
laissez-faire laid the groundwork for a free market system in which "labor was
perceived as a commodity subject to exchange." Id.; see also Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) ("The general right to make a contract in relation
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution." (citing Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S.
578 (1897))).
28. Comment, supra note 3, at 165. The freedom of contract theory
presumes that an employee has an implied right to quit and that an employer
can "discharge employees without liability at any time." Id. The principle of
mutuality of obligation means that the promises made by both parties to a con-
tract are legally binding. Id.; see also Hermann & Sor, supra note 3, at 771 ("Con-
tract theory provided for and validated the mutual rights and obligations of
'free' parties bargaining in permitted transactions."). An employment contract
allowed an employee to quit at a moment's notice. Comment, supra note 3, at
165. The contract, however, was unenforceable because a court could not force
employees to work without "violat[ing] the prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude in the thirteenth amendment to the United States Constitution." Id.
Courts thus found that if an employee could quit at any time, an employer had a
right to fire an employee at any time. Id.; see also Murg & Scharman, supra note 3,
at 336-37 ("As a result of the principles of mutuality of obligation and mutuality
of remedy, employment contracts for life were interpreted to be in effect for an
indefinite period and unenforceable.").
29. Note, supra note 1, at 1826; see also Blades, supra note 3, at 1416. In the
early 1900s, the United States Supreme Court held that an employer's right to
discharge employees was a constitutionally protected property right. Id.; see
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 10 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
173 (1908). For example, in Adair the Court held that due process was violated
by any law which interfered with "the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe
the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to
sell it." Adair, 208 U.S. at 174. For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes
30-35 and accompanying text.
30. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
31. Id. at 174-75.
32. Id. at 175. In Adair, the Court examined the constitutionality of a fed-
eral statutory provision that made the discharge of an employee by an interstate
carrier a criminal offense if the employee's membership in a labor organization
was the basis for the discharge. Id. at 168-69. The Court concluded that the
statutory provision under which the defendant-employer was convicted was un-
7
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The Court reiterated this holding seven years later in Coppage v.
Kansas.3 3 The Coppage Court recognized that "inequalities of fortune"
would necessarily result from the exercise of private property rights and
the freedom of contract. 34 The Court, however, followed its Adair pre-
cedent and held that the right of the employer to discharge an employee
was a constitutionally protected property right.3 5
The mid-1930s marked a retreat from laissez-faire principles. 3 6
State and federal legislation gave employees the right to organize collec-
tively and to force their employers to negotiate for improved employ-
ment conditions, which included protections against wrongful
discharge.3 7 The Court upheld such federal legislation in NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp.38 In this case, the Court implied that employers
enjoyed disproportionate power in employment relationships and could
use this power to coerce employees. 3 9 The Court therefore rejected the
strict freedom of contract approach taken in Adair and Coppage and con-
cluded that Congress was obligated to protect employees' rights
through statutory protection. 40 As a result of this decision, transactions
between employers and employees are now governed by standards of
fairness, reasonable behavior and consistency with important policies. 4 1
constitutional because it arbitrarily interfered with the defendant's personal lib-
erty and property rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 180.
33. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
34. Id. at 17.
35. Id. The Court stated:
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment, in declaring that a State shall not "de-
prive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law," gives to each of these an equal sanction; it recognizes "liberty"
and "property" as co-existent human rights, and debars the States from
any unwarranted interference with either.
Id.
36. PERRrr, supra note 2, at 13.
37. Id. The purpose of this legislation was to ameliorate the imbalance in
the bargaining positions between the employer and the employee. Hermann &
Sor, supra note 3, at 774. The legislation's restrictions on the employer's right to
fire employees were designed to strengthen the employees' bargaining position.
Id.
38. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
39. Id. at 45-46.
40. Id. at 33-34. In this case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional-
ity of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which set forth the rights of
employees and established protection for them through collective bargaining.
Id. at 24, 49. The Court explained that the Act did not compel employers and
employees to reach agreements, but rather fostered negotiation between the
parties. Id. at 45. The Court found that the Act did not interfere with an em-
ployer's normal exercise of its right to discharge an employee. Id. The Act,
however, prohibited the employer from intimidating or coercing an employee
"under cover of that right" with respect to the employee's rights of self-organi-
zation and representation. Id. at 45-46.
41. Note, supra note 1, at 1826 (citing West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379, 391-93 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 523 (1934); Cop-
page v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 27 (1915) (Day, J., dissenting)). Expectations of
8
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B. Common-Law Protection for Private Employees: The Development of
Exceptions to the Employment-at- Will Rule
In the mid-1970s, protection of private sector employees against
wrongful dismissal expanded under the common law.4 2 In an attempt
to redress the inequality in bargaining power between the employee and
employer, state courts created three exceptions to the Employment-at-
Will Rule. 43 These exceptions were first developed under contract the-
ory and then later under tort theory.44
1. Implied-in-Law Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exception
The development of the exceptions began with the doctrine of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.4 5 This doctrine "en-
compasses an obligation to refrain from interfering with the one party's
right to receive the benefits of the contract. '46 With respect to recovery
under this exception, the judiciary is split as to whether an employee
may recover under tort or contract theory. 47 Generally speaking, a dis-
missed employee must show: "(1) Existence of an employment relation-
ship; (2) [t]ermination of the employment; and (3) [sjome aspect of the
both parties have changed during recent years. Blumrosen, supra note 25, at
433. Today, "employees and employers ... expect fair treatment and fair deal-
ing, proof before discipline, and uniform enforcement of reasonable rules of
conduct and discipline." Id. (footnote omitted).
42. PERRrTr, supra note 2, at 14.
43. Comment, supra note 3, at 166-67; see also Wagner v. City of Globe, 722
P.2d 250 (Ariz. 1986) (discussing development of three exceptions to Employ-
ment-at-Will Rule). For a further discussion of the development of these excep-
tions, see generally HILL, supra note 4, at 16-37; PERRITr, supra note 2, at 15-16;
St. Antoine, supra note 3, at 563-65.
44. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 14.
45. Id. at 15; see also Kenneth T. Lopatka, The Emerging Law of Wrongful Dis-
charge-A Quadrennial Assessment of the Labor Law Issue of the 80s, 40 Bus. LAw. 1,
23-26 (1984) (noting that covenant of good faith and fair dealing used in em-
ployment-at-will cases to prohibit termination upon evidence of bad faith, mal-
ice, retaliation and denial of commissions, wages or benefits); Murg &
Scharman, supra note 3, at 361-67 (indicating that covenant of good faith and
fair dealing applied to prevent employer from discharging employee in order to
deprive employee of "prior earned benefits").
46. HILL, supra note 4, at 34 (quoting William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharges:
The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHo L. REV. 201, 245 (1985));
see also Comment, supra note 3, at 167 ("The implied covenant provides that
neither party will do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefit of their agreement." (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251, 1257 (Mass. 1977))). Courts will typically imply a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in wrongful discharge cases "to prevent automatic
losses or forfeitures" of employees' rights. HILL, supra note 4, at 34.
47. HILL, supra note 4, at 34 (comparing Fortune v. National Cash Register
Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) with Rees v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of
America, 332 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964)); see also Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 167 (noting that "courts have held employers liable based
on contract and/or tort theories for breach of an implied-in-law covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.").
1992] 1535COMMENT
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termination that was unfair or in bad faith." 48
The seminal case in the development of modern wrongful dismissal
actions for breach of an implied-in-law covenant is the California case of
Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters.4 9 In Petermann, the
plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged for refusing to follow his
employer's instruction to make false statements in his testimony to a
state legislative committee. 50 Although the employment contract had
no fixed duration, the court held that "in order to more fully effectuate
the state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law.., must deny the
employer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose
employment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dis-
missal is the employee's refusal to commit perjury." '5 1 In so holding,
the court implied a promise on the part of the employer not to discharge
employees for reasons that are contrary to public policy. 52 The court
found that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery because the defendant
had breached the implied covenant of good faith. 53
A second significant case applying the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing exception is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co. 54 In this
case, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was confronted with a plain-
tiff's claim that she was discharged by her foreman because she refused
to go on a date with him. 5 5 The court held that "a termination by the
employer of a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad
faith or malice or based on retaliation is not [in] the best interest of the
economic system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the em-
ployment contract." 56 The court found that sufficient evidence sup-
48. PERRxrr, supra note 2, at 3. Subsequent to such a showing, a jury would
then decide whether the employee was dismissed unjustly and in bad faith. Id.
There is, however, a substantial divergence of judicial opinion with respect to
the elements of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception.
Id.
49. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
50. Id. at 26. The plaintiff alleged that he was fired the day after he refused
to commit perjury at the behest of his employer. Id.
51. Id. at 27. The court noted that "public policy" is "that principle of law
which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the
public or against the public good." Id. (quoting Safeway Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953)).
52. Id. at 27-28; PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 192-93.
53. Petermann, 344 P.2d at 28. The court noted that "[w]hen one, who has
been employed for such time as his services are satisfactory, is discharged it is
'well settled that the employer must act in good faith.' " Id. (citation omitted).
54. 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
55. Id. at 550.
56. Id. at 551 (citing Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425(Ind. 1973)). In arriving at this holding, the court balanced the employee's in-
terest in continuing his employment with the employer's interest in running his
business as he saw fit. Id. The court justified its position by stating that its hold-
ing provides an employee with stability of employment without interfering with
the employer's interest in running his business efficiently. Id. at 552.
1536
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 5 [1992], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss5/7
1992] COMMENT 1537
ported the jury's conclusion that the employee's discharge had been
maliciously motivated and that the defendant had therefore breached
the employment contract.5 7
A few years later, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had the
opportunity to address the implied covenant exception in Fortune v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co. 58 In this case, the employer discharged the plain-
tiff in order to deprive him of commissions earned while he was an
employee. 5 9 The court permitted recovery under a breach of contract
theory and held that even though the employment contract was termina-
ble at will, the contract contained an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. 60 The court concluded that the employer discharged the
employee in bad faith and that the employer was therefore in breach of
the employment contract. 6 '
57. Id. at 552.
58. 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
59. Id. at 1253-55.
60. Id. at 1255-56. The court recognized the employer's need for substan-
tial control over its employees but found that when "commissions are to be paid
for work performed by the employee, the employer's decision to terminate its at-
will employee should be made in good faith. [The employer's] right to make
decisions in its own interest is not . . . unduly hampered by a requirement of
adherence to this standard." Id. at 1256.
61. Id. at 1257-58. The court concluded that a principal acts in bad faith
when it terminates an agent's employment contract just before the completion
of a sale in order to deprive the agent of his full compensation or any portion of
it. Id. at 1257.
For a case resembling Petermann, Monge and Fortune but varying factually, see
Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). In Cleary,
the plaintiff alleged that he was hired pursuant to an oral employment contract
for an indefinite period and was discharged after working for the employer for
eighteen years. Id. at 724-25.
In its analysis, the California court found two factors to be significant. First,
the court looked at the longevity of plaintiff's service and found that
"[t]ermination of employment without legal cause after such a period of time
offends the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained in
all contracts, including employment contracts." Id. at 729. The Cleary court
concluded that this covenant imposed a duty on the employer to refrain from
interfering with the plaintiff's benefits of the employment bargain, which had
accrued during the period of employment. Id.
Second, the court noted the existence of the employer's expressed policy
regarding employee grievances and discharges. Id. The court found that the
existence of this policy proved that this employer "had recognized its responsi-
bility to engage in good faith and fair dealing rather than in arbitrary conduct
with respect to all of its employees." Id.
The court concluded that, because of the length of the plaintiff's service
and the employer's expressed policy, the plaintiff could not be terminated with-
out good cause. Id. The Cleary court noted that once the plaintiff's burden of
proof is met, the plaintiff will have a cause of action under both contract and tort
theories. Id. "Cleary subsequently has been construed to imply a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing only when (1) longevity of employment is present, or
(2) the employer has promulgated a policy for adjudicating employee disputes."
PERRrTr, supra note 2, at 194 n.82 (citing Shapiro v. Wells Fargo Realty Advisors,
199 Cal. Rptr. 613, 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)).
11
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2. Implied-in-Fact Contract Exception
The second wrongful dismissal doctrine created by common law is
the implied-in-fact contract exception. 6 2 This exception "permits a
plaintiff to recover for breach of contract when the employer dismisses
the employee in violation of promises of employment tenure made
orally or implied from a course of conduct or from employee policies or
handbooks." 63
Unlike the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing excep-
tion, the implied-in-fact contract exception only allows employees to re-
cover under contract principles. 64 In order to recover, the plaintiff-
employee must prove the following: "1. The employer made a promise
of employment security; 2. The employee gave consideration for the
promise in the form of detrimental reliance or otherwise; [and] 3. The
employer breached the promise by dismissing the employee."'6 5 Im-
plied-in-fact promises may be derived from employer representations as
well as from an employee's length of service and conduct.66
In two leading cases which have applied this doctrine, employer
representations of employment tenure were made to the employee both
orally and in a personnel handbook. 67 For example, in Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,68 one of the plaintiffs alleged that he was
discharged in violation of his employment contract. 6 9 The employer
had orally assured the plaintiff of job security and had given him an em-
62. PERRi-r, supra note 2, at 15. For a further discussion of this exception,
see generally Lopatka, supra note 45, at 17-22; Murg & Scharman, supra note 3,
at 367-72.
63. PERRrir, supra note 2, at 2 (footnote omitted). This exception has been
similarly defined by other commentators. See, e.g., St. Antoine, supra note 3, at
564 ("[A]n employer's statement of policy as set forth in personnel manuals or
employee handbooks, or an employer's oral or written assurances to employees
at the time of hiring, could be found to constitute an express or implied contract
that an employee would not be discharged except for 'just cause.' " (citing Pugh
v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981))); Comment, supra
note 3, at 167 ("[T]he employment contract may incorporate the terms of a per-
sonnel manual, thereby limiting an employer's ability to discharge employees.
Under this approach, assurances ofjob security in employee manuals or person-
nel policy statements may be terms of an employment contract." (footnotes
omitted)).
64. Comment, supra note 3, at 167.
65. PERRiTr, supra note 2, at 2.
66. Id. at 181. Although promises of job security are often implied from
employer representations in employee handbooks, oral assurances by employers
may also constitute actionable promises. Wagner v. City of Globe, 722 P.2d
250, 254 n.5 (Ariz. 1986). Thus, "absence of a personnel manual or the pres-
ence of disclaiming language in its policies may not absolutely insulate an em-
ployer from liability." Id.
67. PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 183.
68. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
69. Id. at 883.
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ployee handbook reinforcing this oral assurance. 70 The handbook
stated that employees would be dismissed "for just cause only." 7' The
Supreme Court of Michigan found that this provision in the manual con-
stituted an enforceable promise and that the plaintiff was permitted to
recover for his employer's breach of contract. 72 The court held that "an
employer's express agreement to terminate only for cause, or state-
ments of company policy and procedure to that effect, can give rise to
rights enforceable in contract." 7 3 The court thus concluded that an
employee in such a situation may maintain an action for wrongful dis-
charge if dismissed without just cause. 74
Another leading employer representation case is the New York de-
cision of Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.75 In this case, as in Toussaint, the
employer, McGraw-Hill, assured the plaintiff of job security through an
oral promise and a personnel handbook.7 6 The handbook stated that
employees would not be terminated without "just and sufficient
cause." 7 7 The Court of Appeals of New York held that, although there
was no fixed term of employment, the plaintiff relied on these employer
representations of job security and therefore had a valid claim for
breach of contract against his employer for dismissing him without just
70. Id. at 884. The plaintiff testified that his employer, Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Michigan, orally assured him of job security when it told him that "he
would be with the company 'as long as [he] did [his] job.'" Id. The plaintiff had
worked for Blue Cross in a middle management position for five years before
being discharged. Id. at 883.
71. Id. at 884.
72. Id. at 897. The court stated: "Breach of the employer's uniformly ap-
plied rules is a breach of the contract and cause for discharge. In such a case,
the question for the jury is whether the employer actually had a rule or policy
and whether the employee was discharged for violating it." Id. (footnote omit-
ted). The court found that the question of cause for discharge was proper for
the jury and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate
the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Id. at 897 & n.39.
73. Id. at 890. The court noted that Blue Cross had established such a com-
pany policy to dismiss only for just cause, and that this fact was a "separate basis
... sufficient to overcome the presumptive construction that the [employment]
contract was terminable at will." Id. at 892. The court held that such a provision
was enforceable even though the contract was not for any definite term. Id. at
890. The court further stated that "[i]f there is in effect a policy to dismiss for
cause only, the employer may not depart from that policy at whim simply be-
cause he was under no obligation to institute the policy in the first place." Id. at
895.
74. Id. at 890.
75. 443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982).
76. Id. at 442.
77. Id. After McGraw-Hill orally promised the plaintiff job security, the
plaintiff signed a form that indicated that he would be subject to the provisions
of a personnel handbook. Id. A pertinent provision stated that "[t]he company
will resort to dismissal for just and sufficient cause only, and only after all practi-
cal steps toward rehabilitation or salvage of the employee have been taken and
failed. However, if the welfare of the company indicates that dismissal is neces-
sary, then that decision is . . . carried out forthrightly." Id.
13
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cause.
78
The issue of the enforceability of provisions in a personnel hand-
book in the absence of oral promises by the employer was addressed by
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Pine River State Bank v. Mettille.79 In
this case, the plaintiff was hired pursuant to an entirely oral employment
contract of indefinite duration.8 0 Subsequent to the plaintiff's hiring,
his employer distributed a personnel handbook to all of its employees
that contained provisions on disciplinary policy and job security. 8 1 The
plaintiff alleged that he was dismissed without cause and in violation of
handbook provisions on disciplinary procedures. 8 2
Even absent an oral promise, the Minnesota court held that "where
an employment contract is for an indefinite duration, such indefiniteness
by itself does not preclude handbook provisions on job security from
being enforceable, whether they are proffered at the time of the original
hiring or later, when the parties have agreed to be bound thereby."8 3
For personnel handbook provisions to be binding as part of the original
employment contract, however, the court stated that they must satisfy
the requirements for the formation of a unilateral contract.8 4 The Pine
River court concluded that the handbook provisions on disciplinary pro-
cedures satisfied these requirements. The provisions therefore were
binding as part of the original employment contract, and the employer's
failure to comply with these provisions when dismissing the plaintiff was
a breach of this contract. 8 5
78. Id. at 445.
79. 333 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Minn. 1983).
80. Id. at 624. The parties did not discuss the permanency of the plaintiff's
position nor the length of service to be provided. Id.
81. Id. The defendant-employer argued that it never intended the hand-
book to become part of an employment contract; rather, the purpose of the
handbook was merely to inform employees of bank procedures and the availabil-
ity of vacation time. id.
82. Id. at 625. In response to the plaintiff's argument that the defendant
breached his employment contract by the wrongful dismissal, the defendant
mainly argued that it had an unqualified right to terminate the plaintiff because
the plaintiff's contract was at-will. Id.
83. Id. at 629-30.
84. Id. at 627. A binding unilateral contract may be created if the handbook
language constitutes an offer, that offer is communicated to the employee, and
the employee accepts the offer, and consideration is furnished. Id. at 626-27.
The offer must be definite in form and may be communicated by the dissemina-
tion of the handbook to the employee. Id. at 626. The retention of employment
by an at-will employee with knowledge of new or changed conditions constitutes
acceptance. Id. at 627.
85. Id. at 631. The court found that the disciplinary provisions in the per-
sonnel handbook became part of the plaintiff's employment contract, thereby
restricting the defendant's right to discharge the plaintiff at will. Id. at 630.
Interestingly, the handbook provisions on job security in this case were not
found to be enforceable. Id. The court stated that these provisions were merely
general statements of policy and therefore did not meet the contractual require-
ments of an offer. Id. An example of such a general statement, provided by the
14
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Implied-in-fact promises may not only be derived from employer
representations, but also from an employee's length of service and con-
duct. 86 Several courts have looked to "the totality of the course of deal-
ing between employer and employee to determine if a promise of
employment tenure could be inferred." '8 7 For example, the United
States Supreme Court implied a promise of employment tenure from
the length of an employee's service in Perry v. Sindermann.8 8 In this case,
the plaintiff was dismissed from a teaching position at a state college
after ten years of employment. 89 The plaintiff alleged that he had em-
ployment tenure under the school's de facto tenure program.90 He fur-
ther alleged that he relied on a provision in the school's faculty guide
which encouraged a "faculty member to feel that he has permanent ten-
ure as long as his teaching services are satisfactory."''9
The Court held that the plaintiff must be given an opportunity to
"justify his legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment ab-
sent 'sufficient cause.' "92 The Court further recognized that the
plaintiff might prove his claim by showing relevant facts of the circum-
stances of his service, such as the number of years that he had held the
position.93 The Perry Court also noted that an agreement may be im-
plied from "the promisor's words and conduct in the light of the sur-
rounding circumstances." '9 4
Several private sector cases have also taken the "totality of the
court, is an employer's invitation to consider the employee's job a "career situa-
tion." Id. at 626 (citing Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., 110 N.W.2d
863 (Minn. 1961)).
86. PERRrrT, supra note 2, at 181.
87. Id. at 187-88 ("Length of service has been viewed as establishing a
course of dealing from which a promise can be implied in fact or as a factor
influencing application of an implied covenant of good faith." (citing RESTATE-
MENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRAcTs § 18 (manifestation of mutual assent), § 19 (con-
duct as manifestation of assent), § 24 (offer defined) (1981))).
88. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
89. Id. at 594.
90. Id. at 600. The plaintiff alleged that although there was no formal
agreement, the college administration had fostered a binding understanding of
employment tenure. Id. at 599-600.
91. Id. at 600. The plaintiff relied on guidelines promulgated by the school,
which provided that "a person, like himself, who had been employed as a
teacher in the state college and university system for seven years or more has
some form ofjob tenure." Id.
92. Id. at 602-03.
93. Id. at 602. The Supreme Court noted that a teacher, like the plaintiff in
this case, might be able to show an "unwritten 'common law' in a particular
university that certain employees shall have the equivalent of tenure." Id. The
Court suggested that such implied promises may be shown from rules, the exist-
ence of understandings and the length of the employee's service. Id.
94. Id. (quoting 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562 (1960)).
The Court further noted that "[t]he meaning of [the promisor's] words and acts
is found by relating them to the usage of the past." Id. (quoting 3 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 562 (1960)).
15
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course of dealing" approach when considering the issue of an implied-
in-fact promise derived from length of service and conduct.9 5 In the
Tennessee case of Delzell v. Pope,96 the plaintiff was dismissed after work-
ing for his employer for thirteen years. 9 7 The plaintiff sought damages
for an alleged breach of an employment contract. 9 8 In considering the
surrounding circumstances of the parties, the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee noted that there was a period of continued employment without
interruption and that there was a fixed annual salary. 99 According to
the court, these circumstances indicated that "it would be most unrea-
sonable to infer that he was employed upon a month to month basis and
was subject to dismissal on a moment's notice."10 0 The court con-
cluded that there was an "implied understanding based upon a course of
conduct between the complainant and the [employer], and was of suffi-
cient duration to bind the parties."'' °
The California Court of Appeal also considered a case of implied
employment tenure in Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. 102 In Pugh, the court
noted that employers do not have an absolute right to terminate em-
ployees. 10 3 Rather, the court held that "a contract for permanent employment
... cannot be terminated at the will of the employer if it contains an express or
implied condition to the contrary.' 0 4 The court then identified certain fac-
tors to be evaluated when determining whether an implied-in-fact prom-
ise for continued employment exists. These factors include "the
personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longev-
ity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting as-
surances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in
which the employee is engaged."' 0 5
In Pugh, the company president generally refused to terminate ad-
95. PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 187-89.
96. 294 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1956).
97. Id. at 691.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 694. The court noted that many courts view the surrounding cir-
cumstances of the parties as controlling. Id. In Delzell, the court found control-
ling the fact that the plaintiff's employment continued for a period of five years
without interruption and at a fixed salary paid annually. Id.
100. Id. at 693.
101. Id.
102. 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
103. Id. at 922. The court stated: "The mere fact that a contract is termi-
nable at will does not give the employer the absolute right to terminate it in all
cases." Id. (quoting Patterson v. Philco Corp., 60 Cal. Rptr. 110, 111 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967)).
104. Id. at 925 (quoting Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 169,
174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)). The court explained that a contract for "permanent"
employment is "an agreement that the employment relationship will continue
indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer's dis-
satisfaction with the employee's services or the existence of some 'cause' for
termination." Id. at 924.
105. Id. at 925-26 (footnotes omitted).
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ministrative personnel without good cause. 10 6 The plaintiff, however,
was dismissed without any reason after working for the employer for
thirty-two years.' 0 7 The court considered the totality of the parties' re-
lationship and the factors mentioned above in order to determine
whether an implied-in-fact promise for continued employment ex-
isted. 10 8 After considering the facts in evidence, the court concluded
that the jury could determine the existence of such a promise and there-
fore reversed the nonsuit granted by the trial court. 10 9
3. Public Policy Exception
The public policy exception is the final common-law development
of wrongful dismissal. 110 This doctrine is usually based on tort theory
and "recognizes a cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an em-
ployer discharges an employee for a reason that is contrary to an impor-
tant public policy." " '
106. Id. at 919. When the plaintiff began his employment, the president at
the time often told him: "[I]f you are loyal to [See's] and do a good job, your
future is secure." Id.
107. Id. at 918. When the plaintiff asked the president why he was dis-
charged, the president merely told him that "he should 'look deep within
[him]self' to find the answer, and that '[t]hings were said by people in the trade
that have come back to us.'" Id. at 919.
108. Id. at 927. The court noted the duration of the plaintiff's employ-
ment, the employer's policies, the praises, assurances and promotions that the
plaintiff received, and the absence of any direct criticism of the plaintiff's work.
Id.
109. Id. The court provided some guidance to the trial court on remand.
Id. The court found that the plaintiff had demonstrated a prima facie case of
wrongful termination. Id. The court explained that because the plaintiff had
done so, the burden shifted to the employer to come forward with evidence of
the employer's reason for the termination. Id. The court explained that after
the employer comes forward with a reason, the plaintiff could then attack it
"either on the ground that it is pretextual (and that the real reason is one pro-
hibited by contract or public policy ... ), or on the ground that it is insufficient
to meet the employer's obligations under contract or applicable legal princi-
ples." Id. The court stressed that the plaintiff "bears.., the ultimate burden of
proving that he was terminated wrongfully." Id.
110. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 15. For a further discussion of this exception,
see generally Lopatka, supra note 45, at 6-17; Murg & Scharman, supra note 3, at
343-55.
111. Comment, supra note 3, at 166. Most courts base the public policy
exception on tort theory. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385
(Ark. 1988). At least one state, Alabama, has refused to recognize a public pol-
icy exception to the Employment-at-Will Rule. See Howard v. Wolff Broadcast-
ing Corp., 1992 Ala. LEXIS 1276, at *13 (Ala. Feb. 8, 1992). In Howard, the
Supreme Court of Alabama provided three reasons for its refusal to recognize
this exception: "(1) to do so would abrogate the inherent right of contract be-
tween employer and employee; (2) to do so would be to overrule well-estab-
lished employment law; and (3) 'contrary to public policy' is too vague or
nebulous a standard to justify creation of a new tort." Id. at * 16 (quoting
Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131-32 (Ala. 1977)). The
Howard court explained that the Alabama legislature, not the courts, should re-
17
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A majority of courts allow both contract and tort recovery under the
public policy exception. 12 In order to recover, the plaintiff must plead
and prove the following elements:
1. The existence of a clear public policy manifested in a
state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regula-
tion, or in the common law
2. That dismissing employees for conduct like that of the
plaintiff would jeopardize the public policy
3. That the plaintiff's dismissal was motivated by conduct
related to the public policy [and]
4. That the employer lacked overriding legitimate busi-
ness justification for the dismissal.' ' 3
The public policy exception typically arises when an employee is
dismissed for one of three reasons."14 The first reason is when an em-
ployee is discharged for "refusing to commit an unlawful or wrongful
act."1 5 Courts, for example, have applied the public policy exception to
discharges for refusing to violate consumer credit and protection laws,
16
spond "to perceived injustices that can result by a strict application of the long-
standing doctrine of employment 'at-will.' " Id. at "18-19. In fact, previous
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Alabama have been overruled by specific
statutory provisions, which create limited public policy exceptions to the at-will
rule. Id. at *16; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1992) (overruling Meeks v.
Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., 459 So. 2d 814 (Ala. 1984), in which court declined to
recognize public policy exception for discharge resulting from filing of work-
men's compensation claim).
112. Comment, supra note 3, at 166 n.65. Some courts, however, permit a
plaintiff to recover only contract damages. Id. For example, Arkansas bases its
public policy exception exclusively on contract theory. Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988); see also Brockmeyer v. Dun & Brad-
street, 335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983) (basing public policy exception exclusively
on contract theory). Arkansas, however, does allow tort damages on a cause of
action for outrage "[i]f an employer's conduct in breaching a contract of em-
ployment is sufficiently egregious or extreme." Sterling Drug, 743 S.W.2d at 385.
113. PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 3.
114. Comment, supra note 3, at 166-67.
115. Id. at 166 (footnote omitted). For a further discussion of this type of
discharge, see generally HILL, supra note 4, at 28-30.
116. See, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 276 (W. Va.
1978). In Harless, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for requiring his
employer to comply with the state and federal consumer credit and protection
laws. Id. at 272. The plaintiff was summarily fired without being given a reason.
Id. at 273. The defendant-employer asserted that the plaintiff had been an at-
will employee with no fixed duration of employment and thus it had a right to
terminate without giving any reason for doing so. Id.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recognized that "the rule
giving the employer the absolute right to discharge an at will employee must be
tempered by the further principle that where the employer's motivation for the
discharge contravenes some substantial public policy principle, then the
employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by the
discharge." Id. at 275. The court concluded that there was a "clear and
1544 [Vol. 37: p. 1527
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for refusing to violate state food labeling laws,' 17 and for refusing to
participate in illegal price-fixing schemes." 18
The public policy exception may also arise when an employee is
dismissed for "performing a public obligation."' 19 For instance,
courts have applied this exception to dismissals caused by serving
on jury duty120 or by reporting the criminal conduct of a fellow
unequivocal public policy" that consumers obtaining credit are to be extended
protection under legislation. Id. at 276. The court opined that such "manifest
public policy" should not be frustrated by refusing to extend a cause of action to
a discharged employee of a lending institution who seeks to ensure compliance
with federal and state consumer credit and protection laws. Id. Accordingly, the
Harless court sustained the cause of action. Id.
117. See Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 389 (Conn.
1980). In this case, the plaintiff, a quality control director and operations man-
ager, alleged that he had been discharged for reporting to the employer devia-
tions from the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (Act). Id. at
388. The Act prohibits a person from selling mislabeled food and imposes crim-
inal sanctions on those that violate it. Id. Thus, the plaintiff might have been
criminally prosecuted for violating the Act because of his position as quality con-
trol director and operations manager. Id. The Supreme Court of Connecticut
noted that the purpose of the Act was to protect public health. Id. (citing CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 19-211 (1975)). The Sheets court concluded that the plaintiff had a
valid cause of action for wrongful discharge, thereby recognizing an exception
to employment-at-will when a discharge violates public policy. Id. at 386-89.
The court clarified its position by stating that it would not "decide whether vio-
lation of a state statute is invariably a prerequisite to the conclusion that a chal-
lenged discharge violates public policy.... For today, it is enough to decide that
an employee should not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction
or to jeopardize his continued employment." Id. at 389.
118. See, e.g., Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1335 (Cal.
1980). In Tameny, the California Supreme Court evaluated a discharge in which
the plaintiff was allegedly dismissed by his employer for refusing to participate
in an illegal price-fixing scheme. Id. at 1330-31. The plaintiff alleged that upon
refusing to participate in such a scheme, he was told that his dismissal was immi-
nent, and that shortly thereafter he was discharged. Id. at 1332. The court
found that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge.
Id. at 1337.
The Tameny court held that an employee may bring a tort action against an
employer and recover if the employer discharged the employee in violation of
public policy. Id. at 1335 & n. 11. The court found that "an employer's obliga-
tion to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal
act ... reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement
the fundamental public policies embodied in the state's penal statutes." Id. at
1335 (citation omitted).
119. Comment, supra note 3, at 167. For a further discussion of this type of
discharge, see generally HILL, supra note 4, at 30-31.
120. See, e.g., Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975). In Nees, the
court noted that unless there is a contract or legislation to the contrary, "an
employer can discharge an employee at any time and for any cause. Conversely,
an employee can quit at any time for any cause. Such termination by the em-
ployer or employee is not a breach of contract and ordinarily does not create a
tortious cause of action." Id. at 514-15. The court noted, however, that "there
can be circumstances in which an employer discharges an employee for such a
socially undesirable motive that the employer must respond in damages for any
injury done." Id. at 515.
19
Cyranoski: The Model Employment Termination Act: A Welcome Solution to the P
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1527
worker. 121 Finally, the public policy exception may arise when an em-
ployee is dismissed for "exercising a legal right or privilege.' 1 22
Courts, for example, have applied the exception to discharges for filing
a workmen's compensation claim, 123 for exercising pension plan
The court found that such circumstances existed in Nees. The plaintiff al-
leged that she was discharged because she went on jury duty. Id. at 513. The
Supreme Court of Oregon held thatjury duty is an important public interest and
that the employer's discharge of the plaintiff for performing this public obliga-
tion caused the employer to be liable. Id. at 516. The court opined that "[i]f an
employer were [sic] permitted with impunity to discharge an employee for fulfil-
ling her obligation ofjury duty, the jury system would be adversely affected. The
will of the community would be thwarted." Id.
121. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386 (Ark.
1988) ("[T]he public policy of the state is contravened if an employer discharges
an employee for reporting a violation of state or federal law."); Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill. 1981). In Palmateer, the
plaintiff alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for telling local law en-
forcement authorities about a co-worker's possible violation of the state criminal
code and for agreeing to assist in the investigation and trial of the employee.
Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 877. The court found that the plaintiff stated an action-
able claim for retaliatory discharge. Id. at 880. The court recognized that there
are limits on the employer's authority to discharge an employee when the dis-
charge would be injurious to the public's well-being. Id. at 878-80. Accordingly,
the Palmateer court held that the basis of the retaliatory discharge tort is the pro-
tection of public policy, which "favor[s] [the] investigation and prosecution of
criminal offenses." Id. at 880. In so holding, the court emphasized the impor-
tant public policy implications of protecting the lives and property of citizens.
Id. at 879. The court suggested that its holding would encourage the reporting
of crimes and thereby protect the public welfare. Id. at 880.
122. Comment, supra note 3, at 167. For a further discussion of this type of
discharge, see generally HILL, supra note 4, at 31-33.
123. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427-28
(Ind. 1973). In Frampton, the plaintiff alleged that she was discharged by her
employer for filing a workmen's compensation claim. Id. at 426. The plaintiff
was discharged one month after she received a settlement as a result of the claim
that she had filed. Id. According to the complaint, the employer gave no reason
for her discharge. Id. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that the plaintiff
stated a claim for which relief could be granted. Id. at 428. The court recog-
nized that "[rietaliatory discharge for filing a workmen's compensation claim is a
wrongful, unconscionable act and should be actionable in a court of law." Id.
The court found that a plaintiff proving such a discharge would be entitled to
full compensation in damages. Id. The court held that an employee has a statu-
torily conferred right to workmen's compensation that may not be interfered
with by employers. Id. at 427. The court stated that the Indiana Workmen's
Compensation Act "creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for
work-related injuries (through insurance) and a right in the employee to receive
such compensation." Id. The court found that unless employees are able to
exercise their rights without fear of reprisal, the goals of the Indiana Workmen's
Compensation Act would be thwarted and public policy would be undermined.
Id.
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rights,' 2 4 and for exercising the constitutional right of free speech.12 5
C. Current Status of the States
The fifty states continue to differ in their approaches to the dis-
charge of employees.' 26 More than three-fourths of the states have re-
fused to apply the Employment-at-Will Rule with strict adherence. 127
Instead, they have adopted one or more of the common-law wrongful
dismissal exceptions to the Employment-at-Will Rule. 128 Six states,
124. See, e.g., Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc., 488 F. Supp. 822, 826-27
(E.D.N.Y. 1980). In Savodnik, the plaintiff received frequent promotions and an-
nual wage increases. Id. at 823. The plaintiff and his employer had agreed that
the plaintiff would receive a pension fund as part of his compensation and that
these pension rights would vest after 15 years of covered service: Id. at 825-26.
The plaintiff alleged that he had been fired after 13 years of service in order to
avoid the vesting of his pension fund. Id. at 823. The employer did not dispute
that the plaintiff's termination was solely for this purpose. Id. at 826. The em-
ployer, in fact, agreed that the plaintiff was discharged to deprive him of his
benefits under the pension plan but argued that its conduct was not illegal. Id.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that
an employer who discharges a model employee for the purpose of avoiding the
vesting of pension plan rights violates a strong public policy and thus may be
liable for abusive discharge. Id. at 826-27.
The Savodnik court found a strong public policy in protecting the interests
of participants of pension plans. Id. at 826. The court stated that "[t]his policy
is not one of vague origin, or arguable statutory construction-its basis is the
Constitution of the State (Art. 5, § 7)." Id. The court recognized that the em-
ployer may not violate this public policy "under the guise of the employment at
will doctrine." Id.
125. See, e.g., Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898 (3d Cir.
1983). In Novosel, the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for refusing to
assist his employer in a lobbying effort to support no-fault insurance legislation.
Id. at 896. The plaintiff claimed that he was wrongfully discharged in violation
of public policy. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
applied Pennsylvania law and held that an employee who has been dismissed in
violation of a "significant and recognized public policy" may maintain a cause of
action for wrongful discharge. Id. at 898. The Novosel court found that notions
of political and associational freedoms under the United States Constitution and
state constitutions create a "cognizable expression of public policy" that is im-
plicated whenever terms of employment are used to control an employee's polit-
ical activities. Id. at 899 & n.6. The Third Circuit defined a "clearly mandated
public policy" as one that "strikes at the heart of a citizen's social right, duties
and responsibilities." Id. at 899 (quoting Palmateer v. International Harvester
Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981)). The court concluded that there was no
legitimate and plausible reason for the discharge stated in plaintiff's complaint
and that his discharge was in violation of an important public policy. Id. at 900.
126. For a discussion of the states' current approaches, see generally PER-
RITr, supra note 2, at 23-30 & nn.48-99 and PERRITr, supra note 2 (Supp. 1990).
127. Id. at 23.
128. The drafters of the Model Act noted that these exceptions are not ade-
quate to protect employee rights. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 4 (prefatory
note). In general, only the most serious public policy violations by an employer
are actionable in tort. Id. Furthermore, implied-in-fact contract suits based on
an employer's oral or written promises can be ineffective where the employer
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however, still honor the Rule.12 9
III. ANALYSIS OF THE MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
In August 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Model Employment Termination
Act. °30 The Model Act applies to terminations of employment occur-
ring after its effective date,' 3 ' although it does not apply to a termina-
tion at the end of an express, specified period.' 3 2 Under the Model Act,
the word "terminations" generally includes dismissals, suspensions or
layoffs for more than two consecutive months, or the quitting or retiring
by an employee that was induced by an intolerable act or omission by
the employer.133 If the termination at issue qualifies,' 3 4 the Model Act
generally displaces all common-law rights against the employer.13 5 The
employee, however, retains all common-law rights if the termination is
not subject to a good cause requirement' 3 6 or a specified duration
simply disclaims such promises or removes just-cause provisions from its per-
sonnel handbook. Id.
129. PERRrirr, supra note 2, at 29. These states are Delaware, Florida, Geor-
gia, Louisiana, Mississippi and Rhode Island. Id. According to Perritt, "[tihe
highest courts in many of the states still apparently honoring the Employment-
at-Will Rule either have not considered the matter recently, or have expressed
some willingness to recognize exceptions to the rule in an appropriate case." Id.
at 30.
130. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, §§ 1-14 app.
131. Id. § 2(a).
132. Id. § 2(b). Section 2(b) states that the Model Act "does not apply to a
termination at the expiration of an express oral or written agreement of employ-
ment for a specified duration, which was valid, subsisting, and in effect on the
[effective] date of this [Act]." Id.
133. Id. § 1(8). In order to constitute a "termination" under the Act, a
quitting or retiring must be "induced by an act or omission of the employer,
after notice to the employer of the act or omission without appropriate relief by
the employer, so intolerable that under the circumstances a reasonable individ-
ual would quit or retire." Id. § 1(8)(iii). Section 1(8)(iii) incorporates the doc-
trine of "constructive discharge," which is not a violation of the Model Act in
and of itself; rather, it constitutes a termination that becomes a violation if there
is a lack of good cause. Id. § 1(8)(iii) cmt.
134. The termination qualifies if it "requires good cause under Section
3(a), is subject to an agreement for severance pay under Section 4(c), or is per-
mitted by the expiration of an agreement for a specified duration under Section
4(d)." Id. § 2(c).
135. Id. The Act does not, however, displace rights or claims arising under
the following: "state or federal statutes or administrative rules or regulations
having the force of law [or local ordinances valid under state law], a collective-
bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization, or an ex-
press oral or written agreement relating to employment which does not violate
this [Act]." Id. § 2(e). These rights or claims generally do not limit rights under
the Model Act. Id.
136. For a discussion of the requirement of good cause, see infra notes 145-
71 and accompanying text.
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agreement,' 3 7 and if the employee is not a party to a severance pay
agreement. ' 3 8
The Model Act will provide uniformity among states with respect to
wrongful dismissal law. '3 9 Although there is also a lack of uniformity in
other areas of the law such as tort law, the problem is particularly acute
in the employment area. An employer's work force may consist of resi-
dents from different states, particularly in nationwide companies. In
such cases, the diverse state employment laws create uncertainty with
respect to the substantive rights of both employers and employees. 140
The Model Act is designed to lend efficiency and predictability to
employment termination law through uniformity. The Model Act takes
on great importance when applied to national companies because they
"obviously benefit from being able to have standardized personnel poli-
cies" that would be effective beyond state lines.' 4 ' Smaller firms that
have employees working in different states would also benefit. 142 Both
employers and employees would have the advantage of knowing that
their mutual rights and obligations would no longer be determined by
the location of a hiring or firing or where a job was performed. 143 The
Model Act would thus ameliorate the confusion caused by the disparity
among state employment laws.14 4 The remainder of this Comment will
address selected pertinent provisions of the Model Act.
A. The "Good Cause" Requirement
The passage of the Model Act represents a remarkable change in
the level of protection afforded to employees against wrongful discharge
by their employers. Before the Model Act, employees could recover for
wrongful discharge only if an employer breached an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing or an implied-in-fact promise or violated an
important public policy, depending on the state in which the discharge
occurred. 14 5 The Model Act, if adopted by the states, would provide
137. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 2(d). For a discussion of the specified du-
ration agreement, see infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text.
138. MODEL ACT § 2(d). For a discussion of the severance pay agreement,
see infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
139. The express purpose of the Model Act is "to minimize diversity and
improve the law." MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 7 (prefatory note). For a discus-
sion of the lack of uniformity among state laws, see supra notes 7-8 and accompa-
nying text.
140. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 7 (prefatory note).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See PERRIr, supra note 2, at 493-95 (indicating need for legislation to
simplify litigation and to unify existing wrongful dismissal protections). For fur-
ther discussion of the favorable aspects of uniformity, see infra notes 167-71 and
accompanying text.
145. For a discussion of the current status of the states with respect to the
1992] COMMENT 1549
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employees with greater protection by elevating the standard under
which an employer may discharge an employee.
The core of the Model Act is section 3, which sets forth this new
standard. This section provides that, as a general rule, "an employer
may not terminate the employment of an employee without good
cause." 14 6 In order to come within the definition of "employer" or "em-
ployee" under the Model Act, a person must meet certain qualifications
and conditions. 14 7 An "employer" is defined, in part, as a nongovern-
mental "person"' 14 8 employing five or more employees per working
day.14 9 An "employee" is "an individual who works for hire, including
application of the three common law wrongful dismissal doctrines, see PERRIrr,
supra, note 2 at 23-30.
146. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 3(a) (emphasis added). There are two ex-
ceptions to the requirement of "good cause" that relate to a severance pay
agreement and a specified duration agreement. Id. § 4(c)-(d). For a discussion
of these exceptions, see infra notes 183-96 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of these qualifications and conditions, see infra notes
148-51 and accompanying text.
148. "Person" is defined by the Model Act as "an individual, corporation,
business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, or any other
legal or commercial entity [, excluding government or a governmental subdivi-
sion, agency, or instrumentality]." MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 1(7).
149. Id. § 1(2). Employees, whether or not protected under the Model Act,
are counted in determining whether someone constitutes an "employer" within
the meaning of the Act. Id. § 1(2) cmt. These employees must be employed
"for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the two-year
period next preceding a termination or an employer's filing of a complaint pur-
suant to Section 5(c)." Id. § 1(2). Section 5(c) permits an employer to file a
complaint and an arbitration demand under the Model Act to determine
whether there was good cause for an employee's discharge. Id. § 5(c).
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988), was
used, in part, as a basis for the language in the Model Act defining "employer."
Id. § 1(2) cmt. The minimum number of employees under Title VII, however, is
15, and they must have worked "in each of [20] or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year." Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)
(emphasis added). Unlike Title VII, the Model Act requires the minimum
number of five employees, and the 20 qualifying weeks may be spread out over a
two-year period. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 1(2). The reason for these differ-
ences, according to the Uniform Law Commissioners, is the existence of the
general view that "state law should apply more broadly than federal law." Id.
§ 1(2) cmt.
For purposes of defining "employer," the following employees are ex-
cluded: "a parent, spouse, child, or other member of the employer's immediate
family or of the immediate family of an individual having a controlling interest in
the employer." Id. § 1(2). This language, which excludes the immediate family,
is drawn from the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. § 1(2) cmt.
The Model Act only applies to nongovernmental entities. Id. § 1(2). Ac-
cording to the Commissioners, the reason why the Model Act does not apply to
governmental employers is because these entities generally do not hire employ-
ees from multiple states, and therefore the need for uniform treatment of em-
ployees is not as great as in the private sector. Id. § 1(2) cmt. Moreover, many
public employees are already protected against termination through civil service
systems. Id.
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an individual employed in a supervisory, managerial, or confidential po-
sition, but not an independent contractor."15 0 Even if a person qualifies
as an employee under the Act, however, the "good cause" protection
only applies if the employee "has been employed by the same employer
for a total period of one year or more" and "has worked for the em-
ployer for at least 520 hours during the 26 weeks next preceding the
termination." 1 51
The Model Act provides that good cause may arise when either one
of the following exists:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for
termination of the employee's employment in view of relevant
factors and circumstances, which may include the employee's
duties, responsibilities, conduct on the job or otherwise, job
performance, and employment record, or
(ii) the exercise of business judgment in good faith by the
employer, including setting its economic or institutional goals
and determining methods to achieve those goals, organizing or
reorganizing operations, discontinuing, consolidating, or di-
vesting operations or positions or parts of operations or posi-
tions, determining the size of its work force and the nature of
the positions filled by its work force, and determining and
changing standards of performance for positions.' 5 2
150. Id. § l(I).
151. Id. § 3(b). The Act provides a one-year probationary period before
imposing the "good cause" requirement on the employer. Id. § 3(b) cmt. To
the extent that the Act requires the employee to work an average of 20 hours or
more per week during the designated 26 week period, part-time employees are
not covered. Id.
In determining whether the employee has been employed for one year, lay-
offs or "breaks in service" are not counted. Id. § 3(b). A break in service "in-
cludes any time not actually spent on the job except periods, like vacations or
sick leaves or 'personal days,' when an employee is entitled to be away from the
job on the basis of the employer's contract, policy, or special permission." Id.
§ 3(b) cmt. In order for seasonal workers to qualify, they must ordinarily be
employed for more than one twelve-month calendar period. Id. If a break in
service is one year or less, then it is considered a temporary break, which does
"not necessarily destroy the status of a nonprobationary employee." Id.
The Model Act also addresses the possibility of "tacking" employment peri-
ods as follows:
An individual's periods of employment with two separate legal en-
tities may be "tacked" or combined to meet the one-year probationary
requirement if both legal entities meet the definition of "employer"
(e.g., employing five or more employees) and if the predecessor and the
successor are deemed the "same person" because the successor is an
"alter ego" of the predecessor, has assumed the legal obligations of the
predecessor, etc.
Id.
152. Id. § 1(4). The term "good cause" does not include terminations that
are prohibited by state or federal law, such as terminations based upon race, sex
or religion. Id. § 3(a) cmt. The Model Act permits consideration of findings and
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Alternatively, employers and employees may make an express
agreement that specifically states what will constitute "good cause" for
termination. 15 3 They may provide that "the employee's failure to meet
specified business-related standards of performance or the employee's
commission or omission of specified business-related acts will constitute
good cause for termination in proceedings under this [Act]."' 154 Thus,
employees and employers may agree on performance standards, but this
option is available only when it has been enforced consistently and when
it has not been applied disparately to an employee in the absence of
justification.' 55 The agreement also imposes a good faith duty on the
respective parties. 1 5 6
The Model Act's good cause requirement obviates the need for the
common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines. 157 For example, the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing was created to protect employees
against discharges made in bad faith.15 8 The good faith requirement
renders the common-law implied covenant unnecessary because the
Model Act now provides employees with statutory protection against
bad faith terminations. 159
With respect to the implied-in-fact contract exception, the Model
Act expressly invalidates it by stating that "[c]ontract actions based on
conclusions made in other forums in proceedings under the Model Act with re-
spect to "public policy" and "good cause." Id. A finding in another tribunal
that an employer did not discriminate on the basis of race or sex does not "pre-
clude a charge that a termination of an employee by the employer was, nonethe-
less, a termination without good cause under this Act. That an employer has not
discriminated does not necessarily mean that it had justifiable grounds for the
discharge." Id.
153. See id. § 4(b). If such agreements were not entered into, then an arbi-
trator would make the determination of what constitutes "good cause" when
confronted with an individual employee's termination. Id. § 4(b) cmt.
154. Id. § 4(b). Although the Act provides flexibility in making the agree-
ment, there can be no duress or overreaching by the parties. Id. § 4(b) cmt.
155. Id. § 4(b). If the agreement gives the employer the authority to
change the prohibitions or standards, these changes must be communicated to
the employee in clear terms. Id.
156. Id. § 4(g). This duty of good faith extends to the agreement's "forma-
tion, performance, and enforcement." Id.
157. For a discussion of the common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines, see
supra notes 42-125 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
exception, see supra notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
159. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 1(4). "Good faith" is defined under
the Model Act as "honesty in fact." Id. § 1(5). An employer who is accused of
discharging an employee in bad faith might argue that the reasons for discharge
were the employer's business needs and external economic conditions. See id. at
8 (prefatory note). Although these appear to be legitimate grounds for termina-
tion, the employee might try to prove pretext-e.g., that the employer's eco-
nomic status was not the real reason for the discharge. The employee might
prove pretext by presenting evidence relating to the employer's financial
records, the size of the work force, and any economic forecasts. See id. § 1(4).
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terminations under implied-in-fact employment agreements are . . .
abolished for employees protected by this Act."' 160 The legislators
probably abolished this common-law action because it would otherwise
have been duplicative of the statutory cause of action provided for in the
Model Act. For instance, courts have used the implied-in-fact contract
exception to allow recovery when an employer has breached an express
promise in an employee handbook to terminate "for just cause only." 16'
The Model Act now provides for a good cause requirement, thereby
rendering the common-law exception unnecessary. 162
The public policy exception is also no longer necessary under the
Model Act because an employer violating an important public policy
would not be able to meet the good cause requirement in the Act.' 6 3
For example, prior to the Act, if an employee of a nuclear power plant
was discharged solely for reporting regulatory violations to governmen-
tal authorities, the employee would have been protected only in a state
that had adopted the public policy exception.' 64 Under the Model Act,
if the sole reason for discharge was the reporting of regulatory viola-
tions, the employee would be protected because the discharge of an em-
ployee for such reason would not constitute good cause.' 65 Thus, a
public policy exception is also unnecessary; the good cause requirement
of the Model Act protects against this type of discharge. 166
The Model Act's good cause requirement promotes uniformity in
employment termination law and is therefore a positive step in enabling
both employers and employees to better understand their rights and ob-
160. Id. § 2(c) cmt.
161. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 292
N.W.2d 880, 890 (Mich. 1980). For a discussion of Toussaint, see supra notes 68-
74 and accompanying text. See also Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hosp.,
688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984) (holding that employer's representations in per-
sonnel manual may become terms of employment contract limiting employer's
ability to discharge employees); Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr.,
505 N.E.2d 314, 318 (Ill. 1987) (holding that language in employee handbook
providing that employee could be discharged only after written notice was suffi-
cient to modify employee's at-will contract); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche,
491 A.2d 1257, 1264 (N.J. 1985) (holding that employment manual contained
implied promise that employee would be fired only for just cause and was en-
forceable even though employment was "at will" and for an indefinite term).
162. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 3(a).
163. For a discussion of the public policy exception, see supra notes 110-25
and accompanying text.
164. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (Ill.
1981) (public policy tort claim exists for employee dismissed after supplying in-
formation to local law-enforcement agency indicating possible violation by fel-
low worker of state criminal code and for agreeing to assist in investigation and
prosecution of suspected crime).
165. Legitimate grounds for termination which satisfy the "good cause" re-
quirement under the Model Act include employee misconduct or incompetence,
or employer business needs or external economic conditions. MODEL ACT, supra
note 7, at 8 (prefatory note).
166. See id. § 1(4) (defining "good cause").
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ligations. Some, however, may question why the Model Act changes the
common law so drastically by requiring good cause, and whether such a
requirement is desirable. 16 7 For example, some opponents of the
Model Act might make the traditional, laissez-faire argument that an em-
ployer should be able to fire employees at any time because employees
may quit at any time. 168 They might continue to argue that the Model
Act thus unfairly imposes an obligation on the part of the employer to
retain an employee unless there is good cause for a discharge, but im-
poses no comparable obligation on the employee's part.' 69
This view, however, contravenes social policy. An employer, by do-
ing business with society, reaps great benefits and profits. In return, an
employer owes a duty to society to treat employees, as members of that
society, with dignity. Employees should not be merely discarded at the
whim of powerful employers. The drafters of the Model Act recognized
this social policy and worked not only to achieve uniformity but also to
provide employees with greater job protection. 170 The good cause re-
quirement thus serves as a socially desirable means of achieving uni-
formity in employment termination law.17'
The good cause requirement, however, is likely to provoke resist-
ance to the Model Act by labor unions. If the Act is adopted, employees
may be less likely to join unions for protection against unfair treatment
by the employer. Rather than relying upon the unions for protection,
workers may be able to rely upon the Model Act's good cause require-
ment and therefore avoid paying union dues. Thus, the new Act may
have a negative impact on union membership.
167. No state has imposed such a blanket requirement on employers when
discharging their employees. While the minority of states still follow a strict
employment-at-will approach, the majority of states will only allow the plaintiff
to recover for wrongful discharge if the discharge falls within one of the
common-law wrongful dismissal doctrines, which were developed as exceptions
to the Employment-at-Will Rule. PERRITr, supra note 2, at 23. For a discussion
of the current status of the states, see supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
Although the states have not imposed a good cause requirement as found in
the Model Act, several legal scholars had proposed the requirement in a 1982
Villanova Law Review article. See Peirce et al., supra note 16, at 45-46 ("[W]e
propose that a Uniform Model Act be enacted and adopted by the individual
states . . . [to] limit an employer's right to terminate an employee . . . to 'just
cause.' " (footnotes omitted)).
168. For a discussion of this laissez-faire argument, see supra note 27 and
accompanying text.
169. For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's constitutional argu-
ment with respect to compelling the retention of personal services of another,
see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
170. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 4, 7-8 (prefatory note).
171. For a discussion of the favorable effect of uniformity among the states,
see supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
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B. Jurisdictional Requirements
Although the Act provides employees with more protection, its ju-
risdictional provisions may seem inappropriate when compared to sev-
eral federal discrimination laws. In order for the Act to apply and thus
trigger the "good cause" protection, a "person"' 17 2 must have "em-
ployed [five] or more employees for each working day in each of [twenty]
or more calendar weeks in the two-year period next preceding a termi-
nation or an employer's filing of a complaint."' 173 In comparison, both
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964174 and the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act of 1990175 apply to a "person" 176 withfifteen or more employ-
ees, 177 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967178
covers a "person"' 179 with twenty or more employees. 180 The jurisdic-
tional provisions of the Model Act will therefore produce the curious
result of applying to more businesses than federal laws which address
significant issues of discrimination.
The jurisdictional requirement of the Model Act, however, may be
beneficial to an employee bringing an action based on discrimination.
An employee coming within the jurisdictional provisions of an applica-
ble federal discrimination statute, such as Title VII, will automatically
have available a cause of action under the Model Act because the Act
requires an employer to have a fewer number of employees than Title
VII.181
172. For the definition of "person" under the Model Act, see supra note
148.
173. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 1(2) (emphasis added).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988). Title VII is a federal statute which makes it
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual with respect to
the terms of employment because of the individual's race, color, sex, religion, or
national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1990).
176. Title VII defines "person" as including "one or more individuals, gov-
ernments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partner-
ships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-
stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases
under Title 11, or receivers." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a). The Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA) defines "person" in the same manner as Title VII. See 42
U.S.C. § 12111(7).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The ADA, however, has a phase-in provision
which provides that the 15 employee requirement will not be in effect until after
1994. From 1992 to 1994, the ADA will apply only to a "person" with 25 or
more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).
178. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
179. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) defines "person"
as meaning "one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, labor organiza-
tions, corporations, business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized
groups of persons." Id. § 630(a).
180. Id. § 630(b).
181. While Title VII requires an employer to have 15 or more employees,
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Nonetheless, the jurisdictional requirement seems inappropriate
when applied to employers with smaller businesses. For instance, Title
VII's objective in covering those with fifteen or more employees was to
prevent smaller businesses, such as family-owned restaurants, from be-
ing required to retain employees against the businesses' will. Similarly,
the Model Act should give smaller businesses more discretion in dis-
charging employees by not subjecting them to the good cause require-
ment. This result could easily be accomplished by raising the required
number of employees under the definition of "employer" to a number
comparable to that required under Title VII.18 2 States adopting the
Model Act should therefore make this revision in the interest of employ-
ers with smaller businesses.
C. Exceptions to the Good Cause Requirement
Under the Model Act, good cause is generally required to discharge
an employee except in either one of two circumstances. 18 3 First, the
Model Act allows employers and employees to "dispense with the re-
quirement of good cause altogether as long as a minimum schedule of
graduated severance payments is provided."' 184 Thus, an employer and
employee may waive the good cause requirement mutually through an
express written agreement if the employer agrees to provide severance
pay upon the termination of the employee for any reason except the
employee's willful misconduct. 185 If such payments are provided, the
employment becomes "at will" because the employer now has the dis-
cretion to discharge an employee at any time and for any reason. 186 A
the Model Act requires only five or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b);
MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 1(2).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (requiring 15 or more employees).
183. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c), (d).
184. Id. § 4 cmt. The severance pay must be an amount "equal to at least
one month's pay for each period of employment totaling one year, up to a maxi-
mum total payment equal to 30 months' pay at the employee's rate of pay in
effect immediately before the termination." Id. § 4(c). The employer may pay a
lump sum or make monthly installment payments. Id. Neither types of payment,
however, "may be less than one month's pay plus interest on the principal bal-
ance." Id. The employer must pay the lump sum or begin the monthly pay-
ments within a 30-day period following the employee's termination. Id.
185. Id. § 4(c). If a severance pay agreement is reached, any disputes over
the employee's entitlement to severance pay or the nature of the termination
will be subject to the procedures and remedies of the Model Act. Id. An agree-
ment results in a waiver by the parties of their rights to a civil trial, including a
jury trial. Id.
186. Id. § 4(c) cmt. The provision for a severance pay agreement, however,
is likely to apply only to key professionals, management personnel and other
individuals who are not subject to periodic layoff. Id. The reason for this exclu-
sive application is to prevent the employer from taking the risk that an employee
who is laid off for more than two months will treat the layoff as a "termination"
under § 1(8)(ii) and demand severance pay under a severance pay agreement.
Id. Section 1(8)(ii) defines termination in part as an employee's layoff or suspen-
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severance pay agreement, however, imposes a good faith duty in its
"formation, performance, and enforcement."'18 7
The second exception to the good cause requirement relates to an
employment agreement of a specified duration. 18 8 More specifically,
"[t]he requirement of good cause for termination does not apply to the
termination of an employee at the expiration of an express oral or writ-
ten agreement of employment for a specified duration related to the
completion of a specified task, project, undertaking, or assignment."' 8 9
For example, seasonal employees, even if covered under the Act, would
ordinarily come within this exception and therefore may be lawfully dis-
charged upon the completion of their tasks.190 An agreement for a spec-
ified duration imposes the same duty of good faith on the parties as the
agreement for severance pay. 19 ' The good cause requirement, how-
ever, will be imposed with respect to an agreement for a specified dura-
tion if the employment continues after the agreement's expiration,
unless a new express oral or written agreement is entered into by the
parties. 192
Although the employment agreement of a specified duration is a
legitimate qualification of the statutory rights accorded employees
sion caused by an employer that lasts for more than two consecutive months. Id.
§ 1(8)(ii). If the employee decided to treat the layoff as a termination and claim
his severance pay, the employee would forfeit all recall rights. Id. § 4(c) cmt.
187. Id. § 4(g). Valid severance pay agreements will be enforced in pro-
ceedings under the Model Act. Id. § 4 cmt.
188. See id. § 4(d).
189. Id. The Act provides the following illustrations:
[A] skilled craftsperson may be hired to help install the plumbing in a
new office building or a university professor may be invited to visit at
another school and offer a certain set of courses.
Even though each assignment takes over a year of full-time work,
neither employee has a claim to continued employment upon the com-
pletion of the respective undertakings.
Id. § 4(d) cmt.
A specified duration agreement will be "enforceable through the usual
processes of law in the courts (or through private arbitration, if so provided)
unless the parties expressly agree to use the procedures and remedies provided
by this Act." Id. § 4 cmt.
190. Id. § 4(d) cmt. Seasonal employees, however, are treated the same as
other employees with respect to other types of terminations. Id. For example, if
the employees satisfy the conditions under § 3(b), they may assert their "good
cause" rights by filing complaints under the Model Act if there are any other
terminations. Id. For a discussion of § 3(b), see supra note 151 and accompany-
ing text. Under §§ 2(c) and (d), seasonal employees "retain . . . their full com-
mon-law rights until the period of their employment qualifies them for ['good
cause'] protection under [slection 3(a)." MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 4(d) cmt.
191. Id. § 4(g). "It is the intent of [s]ection 4 not to allow so-called 'con-
tracts of adhesion' to be used to waive or otherwise circumvent employees'
rights under the Act." Id. § 4 cmt.
192. Id. § 4(d). The period of employment under an agreement of a speci-
fied duration counts toward the minimum employment periods required under
section 3(b). Id.
1992] 1557
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under the Act, the provision for a severance pay agreement creates a
public policy issue. Prior to the Model Act, employers generally could
discharge employees without giving severance pay unless the employer
violated an important public policy, in which case many states allowed
employees to recover for wrongful discharge under the public policy ex-
ception. 193 The Model Act does not specifically address the situation in
which an employer provides severance pay after discharging an em-
ployee for a reason that violates an important public policy.' 94 There-
fore, if the reason for termination violates an important public policy,
the agreement waiving the good cause requirement should not be up-
held. In such cases, employees should be allowed to recover under the
Model Act for their discharge without good cause.19 5 Such recovery
would serve the public interest of society. 19 6
D. Arbitration
In addition to the good cause and jurisdictional requirements, the
Model Act provides for a system of arbitration.' 9 7 A discharged em-
ployee may file a complaint and demand for arbitration under the Act
with a designated public agency provided that the employee's filing is
timely. 198 An employer who discharges an employee must "mail or de-
193. For cases applying the public policy exception and finding wrongful
termination, see supra notes 112-25 and accompanying text.
194. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c).
195. For a discussion of the possible remedies under the Model Act, see
infra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (Ill.
1981). An employee who is retaliatorily discharged for reporting a fellow
worker's possible criminal violations should be able to recover even though a
severance pay agreement was made. To do otherwise would contravene an im-
portant public policy. As the Palmateer court significantly recognized:
No specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen
to take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but
public policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters. "Public policy
favors the exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possess-
ing knowledge thereof is essential to effective implementation of that
policy. Persons acting in good faith who have probable cause to believe
crimes have been committed should not be deterred from reporting
them by the fear of unfounded suits by those accused."
Id. at 880 (quoting Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 N.E.2d 229, 231 (Il.
1980)).
197. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 5(a). Sections five through eight of the
Model Act provide an arbitration system. See id. §§ 5-8. The Act provides that a
public agency, such as "a state department of labor, labor relations commission,
mediation service, or unemployment compensation bureau," should be respon-
sible for the appointment of arbitrators. Id. § 6(a) cmt. The drafters reasoned
that a public agency should be charged with this responsibility because "the
right to protection against discharge without good cause" is a "public right." Id.
198. Id. § 5(a). The employee must file "not later than 180 days after the
effective date of the termination, the date of the breach of an agreement for
severance pay under [slection 4(c), or the date the employee learns or should
have learned of the facts forming the basis of the claim, whichever is latest." Id.
1558 [Vol. 37: p. 1527
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liver to the terminated employee a written statement of the reasons for
the termination and a copy of this [Act] or a summary approved by the
[Commission; Department; Service]."' 9 9 An employer also has the op-
portunity to file a complaint and demand for arbitration for the purpose
of determining whether there is good cause to fire the named em-
ployee.2 0 0 The employer, however, must notify the discharged em-
ployee and list the alleged factors constituting good cause for his
termination. 20 1 The employee must then respond to this action by fil-
ing an answer.20 2
The complainant, whether the employee or employer, has the bur-
den of proof.20 3 Section 6(f) of the Model Act states that "[i]f an em-
ployee establishes that a termination was motivated in part by
impermissible grounds, the employer, to avoid liability, must establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated the
employment even in the absence of the impermissible grounds. °2 0 4
The Model Act empowers arbitrators to make certain awards when
they find that an employer has violated the Act's provisions. 20 5 The
available awards include one or more of the following: reinstatement,
backpay and reimbursement for lost fringe benefits, a lump-sum sever-
199. Id. § 5(b). Such statement must be mailed or delivered within 10 busi-
ness days after a termination. Id.
200. Id. § 5(c).
201. Id. The intention to file and the alleged factors must appear in a writ-
ten statement and be mailed or delivered to the employee at least 15 business
days before the filing of the complaint and demand for arbitration. Id.
202. Id. § 5(d). The answer must be filed within 21 days after receiving the
complaint. Id. Conversely, if the respondent is the employer, the answer must
contain a copy of the statement of the reasons for the termination given to the
employee. Id.
203. See id. § 6(e). Section 6(e) expressly sets the following burdens of
proof: "A complainant employee has the burden of proving that a termination
was without good cause or that an employer breached an agreement for sever-
ance pay under [s]ection 4(c). A complainant employer has the burden of prov-
ing that there is good cause for a termination." Id.
204. Id. § 6(f). Section 6(f) generally incorporates the principles of "dual
motive" set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). MODEL
ACT, supra note 7, § 6(f) cmt. In this case, the United States Supreme Court
considered the burdens of proof of a plaintiff and a defendant in a Title VII suit
where it had been shown that the employer's decision to terminate an employee
was motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate considerations. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232. The Court held that when a plaintiff shows that
gender was a motivating factor in an employment decision, the defendant may
avoid being held liable if it can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff's
gender into consideration. Id. at 258; see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(m) (1992) (incorporating principles of dual motives).
205. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 7. The drafters noted that emotionally
charged and unpredictable juries impose unreasonably high judgments against
employers under existing laws. Id. at 4 (prefatory note). It is common for jury
awards to exceed $1 million, typically due to the addition of punitive damages.
Id. at 3 (prefatory note).
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ance payment if reinstatement is not awarded, and attorney's fees. 20 6
An employee who has been discharged without good cause may also be
awarded a "declaratory judgment" award in certain circumstances. 20 7
The awards for a violation of an agreement for severance pay may in-
clude either or both of the following: attorney's fees and the enforce-
ment of the severance pay provision and other applicable provisions of
the agreement. 20 8
An arbitrator may not award damages other than those listed above
for violations of the Act or of a severance pay agreement. 20 9 In other
words, no damages may be awarded for "pain and suffering, emotional
distress, defamation, fraud, or other injury under the common law; pu-
nitive damages; compensatory damages; or any other monetary
award." '2 10 As a result, the Model Act will likely ameliorate the problem
of unreasonably high judgments against employers by its severe limita-
tions on the range of available remedies. 2 11
The Model Act allows either party to an arbitration to seek vacation,
modification or enforcement of the arbitrator's award upon complying
with applicable procedures. 21 2 A vacation or modification will be
granted only if the award was procured by improper means, 21 3 there
was evident misconduct by the arbitrator, 2 14 the powers of the arbitrator
206. Id. § 7(b). The preferred remedy for terminations under the Model
Act is reinstatement. Id. § 7(b)(3) cmt. If this remedy is not feasible "because of
the personal relations between the employer and the employee, changes in the
employer's business, or other appropriate grounds, severance pay may be
awarded instead." Id. Back pay may be awarded regardless of whether an em-
ployer is reinstated. Id. § 7(b)(2) cmt. Therefore, back pay may be provided
even if a severance payment is ordered instead of reinstatement. Id.
The Model Act's language with respect to the award of attorney's fees to
prevailing employees or employers "deliberately tracks the language of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and of Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title
VII." Id. § 7(b)(4), (c)(2), (e), (f) cmt. (citing Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975); Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412
(1978)).
207. Id. § 7(b) cmt. Such judgment may be awarded when the employer
did not have just cause for firing an employee, but neither severance pay, rein-
statement nor backpay is appropriate or warranted. Id.
208. Id. § 7(c).
209. Id. § 7(d). Under section 7(d), any recovery by the employee in other
forums relating to the same conduct of the employer shall be deducted from the
arbitrator's award in order to prevent multiple recovery for the same claim. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 4 (prefatory note).
212. Id. § 8(a). "An application for vacation or modification must be filed
within [90] days after issuance of the arbitrator's award. An application for en-
forcement may be filed at any time after issuance of the arbitrator's award." Id.
§ 8(b).
213. Id. § 8(c)(1). Corruption or fraud, for example, would constitute im-
proper means. Id.
214. Id. § 8(c)(2). Such misconduct would include partiality, which would
prejudice a party's rights. Id.
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were exceeded, "the arbitrator committed a prejudicial error of law," or
"another ground exists for vacating the award under the [Uniform Arbi-
tration Act]" or the applicable state arbitration act. 21 5
E. Alternatives to Arbitration
The Model Act provides that a state may select one of two alterna-
tives to the arbitration system described in the previous section. 2 16 Al-
ternative A provides that the enforcement of the Act will be handled
through administrative proceedings. 2 17 The remedies that may be
awarded under this alternative are identical to those provided under the
arbitration system; 2 18 however, the designated public agency is respon-
sible for the granting of remedies rather than the arbitrator. 21 9 Alterna-
tive B provides that the enforcement of the Act would be left to the civil
courts. 220 The remedies are identical to those under the arbitration sys-
tem and Alternative A, except that a court would be responsible for
granting them.2 21
The alternatives, as well as the arbitration system under the Model
Act, provide basically the same type of remedies afforded under certain
federal discriminatory statutes such as Title V112 22 and the Americans
With Disabilities Act.2 2 3 All of these statutes afford a successful plaintiff
the opportunity to receive backpay, reinstatement and attorney's
fees.2 24
215. Id. § 8(c)(3)-(5). The court may award a prevailing employee reason-
able attorney's fees and costs, in an application for vacation, modification or
enforcement of the arbitrator's award. Id. § 8(d). The court may award a pre-
vailing employer reasonable attorney's fees and costs in an application for vaca-
tion, modification or enforcement of an arbitrator's award "if the court finds the
employee's application is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." Id.
216. Id. app.
217. Id. This alternative is provided for states that may believe that it will
be less costly to employ governmental personnel, such as full-time civil service,
as hearing officers. Id. app. cmt.
218. For a discussion of the remedies provided under the arbitration sys-
tem, see supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
219. See MODEL ACT app.
220. Id. Although it is the most complex, expensive and time-consuming
procedure, Alternative B is available for states whose constitutions may preclude
the use of other forums. Id. app. cmt.
221. Id. app. The preferred method, however, for affording statutory pro-
tection to employees who are wrongfully discharged is the use of professional
arbitrators. Id. app. cmt. They have the "requisite skill, training, and experi-
ence to understand the special problems of the workplace, and are most likely to
be acceptable to the management and employee communities. Their efficiency
in resolving disputes over discharge and discipline may also reduce the time and
expense of the proceedings." Id.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1992).
223. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1992).
224. See MODEL ACT, supra note 7, § 7; see also ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1985); ADA, 29 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (1992); Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), (k)
(1992).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The cases examined in this Comment illustrate the wide disparity
among states' employment laws with respect to wrongful dismissal. 22 5
The Model Employment Termination Act will provide a much needed
solution to the problems caused by this disparity. The Model Act will
lessen the confusion caused to an employer and employee when the em-
ployer is situated in one state and its employees reside in different
states. 2 26 In addition, "[i]nterstate competition for 'favorable business
climates' may also be reduced by establishing uniform standards for em-
ployment termination. ' 2 27 Finally, the Model Act will afford additional
job security to employees by providing a general rule prohibiting an em-
ployer from terminating an employee without good cause. 22 8 In adopt-
ing this Model Act, the states will further promote the important
principle that evolved through the modern wrongful dismissal common
law: fairness in the employment relationship.
Debra Drew Cyranoski
225. For a discussion of this disparity, see supra notes 126-29 and accompa-
nying text.
226. For a discussion of this confusion, see supra notes 7-8 and accompany-
ing text. See also PERRrrr, supra note 2, at 493-95.
227. MODEL ACT, supra note 7, at 7 (prefatory note).
228. A comparison of the Model Act to common-law trends indicates that
the drafters intended to give employees further protection against wrongful dis-
missal. If the intent of the Model Act was solely to provide uniformity, the Com-
missioners could have drafted and approved a Model Act that honored the
Employment-at-Will Rule. Instead, the Model Act protects employees by requir-
ing good cause for their termination under § 3. For a discussion of this "good
cause" requirement, see supra notes 145-71 and accompanying text.
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